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1  INTRODUCTION
Nigeria is one of the countries in the world that has one of the highest number 
of people living with HIV/AIDS. A recent report shows that 4.4% of the pop-
ulation of about 140 million people is living with HIV/AIDS.1 After South 
Africa, Nigeria has the largest number of people living with HIV/AIDS in Af-
rica.2 South Africa is estimated to have about six million people living with 
HIV/AIDS.3 Prisoners, in particular, tend to be more affected due to their vul-
nerable nature. In 2002, the national HIV prevalence in Nigeria was about 
5.8%, whereas that of the prisons was estimated to be about 8.5%.4 At the 
onset of the epidemic, which was strongly denied, the government was seen 
as doing little or nothing about it. Persons living with or affected by the epi-
demic were discriminated against and stigmatised. There were documented 
cases of discrimination against persons living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) in 
the health care sector, the employment, environment, allocation of housing, 
within community, in the family and virtually every facet of life.5 This has led 
to a serious human rights challenge for the affected persons. Many of them 
were, and still are, unable to seek legal redress for violation of their rights due 
to ignorance or fear of stigmatisation. The few who are bold enough to go to 
court encounter an unfriendly environment.
 The author is grateful to Prof. Charles Ngwena of the University of the Free State for his direction 
and comments on the earlier draft of this article.
1 Federal Ministry of Health(FMOH) Report of the National HIV/syphilis sentinel Sero prevalence sur-
vey, (2005).
2 UNAIDS Report on the global AIDS epidemic (2006) 6.
3 Ibid.
4 See HIV/AIDS prevalence in Nigerian prisons far higher than nation average http://www.prisonpas-
tor.com/newsline.htm.
5 See Center for the Right to Health (CRH) HIV/AIDS and human rights: Experiences of people living 
with HIV/AIDS in Nigeria, (2001)5.
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In 2000, a woman who had her employment terminated by her employer 
based on her HIV/AIDS status filed a case in a High Court in Lagos to chal-
lenge the purported termination of her employment as being unlawful, illegal 
and unconstitutional. During the trial, the judge had ruled that unless an 
expert gave evidence that the court room would not be infected, the woman 
would be barred access to court to give evidence in her case.6 The case is now 
before a Court of Appeal in Lagos, the first case on HIV, to be filed in a Nige-
rian court. This article critically reviews the Federal High Court’s decision in 
Festus Odaife & Others v Attorney General of the Federation & Others (Festus 
Odaife case)7 relating to equal enjoyment of fundamental human rights of 
prisoners living with HIV/AIDS as guaranteed under Nigerian Constitution 
and other relevant international human rights instruments. Furthermore, this 
article compares critically the approach of the court’s decision in the Festus 
Odaife with discussions in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
Part 1 briefly states the facts of the case and the decision. Part 2 exam-
ines the decision of the court against the background of Nigerian laws and 
international human rights instruments protecting the rights to health, non- 
discrimination and life of people living with HIV, particularly prisoners. Part 
3 is a comparative analysis of case law. Part 4 concludes the article and sug-
gests the way forward. 
2  FACTS OF THE CASE
The applicants in this case were four prisoners living with HIV/AIDS who 
were detained without trial at Kirikiri maximum prison in Lagos on the order 
of a Magistrate. They faced various capital charges, ranging from armed rob-
bery to murder, which attract the capital punishment. While in detention 
the applicants became ill and were later diagnosed as HIV positive. They 
were subsequently stigmatised and discriminated against by prison officials. 
When the applicants suffered from opportunistic infections, the prison offi-
cials denied them treatment in violation of the law. The applicants then filed 
an action for the enforcement of their fundamental rights in accordance with 
section 46 of the Constitution8 seeking declaratory relief that:
1. Their continued detention, without trial and consequent acts of segrega-
tion and discrimination based on HIV/AIDS status infringed their right to 
human dignity and freedom from non-discrimination guaranteed under 
sections 34 and 42 of the Constitution;
2. They were entitled to proper medical attention in accordance with the 
provisions of the Prisons Act9, Prison Regulations Law and the United 
Nations Minimum Standard Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners;
3. Their denial of medical attention violated their rights to human dignity 
and freedom from discrimination guaranteed under sections 34 and 42 
of the Constitution, as well as article 5 of the African Charter on Human 
6  Georgina Ahamefule v Imperial Medical Centre and other [Unreported suit no ID/1527/2000 (HC)]
7  (2004) AHRLR 205 (NgHC 2004).
8  Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.
9  The Prison Act of 1945 Cap 29 Laws of the Federation 1990.
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and Peoples’ Rights.
4. They be relocated to public hospitals where they could receive proper 
medical care. 
The applicants further claimed that their continuous incarceration in the 
manner shown in their affidavit was inhuman, unjust, primitive, counter- 
productive, null, void and that it offended the provisions of the 1999 Consti-
tution on the dignity of the human being.
In his judgment Nwodo J of the Federal High Court in Port - Harcourt held 
that failure on the part of the prison officials to provide medical care for the 
applicants due to their HIV status violated section 8 of the Prison Act and 
article 16 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The Court 
held, while admitting that issues relating to socio-economic rights often raise 
the challenge of lack of resources, particularly with regard to medical care, 
that a state has the duty to comply with existing statues with regard to pro-
viding treatment to prisoners. In particular, section 8 (1) and (3) of the Pris-
ons Act requires Nigerian government to ensure that the applicants who had 
contacted HIV/AIDS while in detention be taken to a hospital for medical 
attention. Moreover, failure on the part of the state to provide treatment for 
the applicants, which was solely based on their HIV status, constituted an 
act of torture and was inhuman and degrading.10 The Court, however, held 
that denial of treatment to the applicants who are HIV positive while it may 
constitute inhuman and degrading treatment – did not amount to an act of 
discrimination as envisaged by section 42 of the Constitution. According 
to the Court, disease status is not one of the enumerated grounds for non- 
discrimination in section 42 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court held 
that a denial of treatment to the applicants did not constitute a violation of 
their rights to life, as there was no medical evidence to show that HIV/AIDS 
is a life-threatening disease which may result in death if medical attention 
was not provided. This decision of the Court is now analysed based on the 
following subheadings.
3  ANAYLSIS 
An important issue considered by the court was access to treatment for the 
enjoyment of the right to health and the right to non-discrimination with re-
gard to people living with HIV/AIDS. Under Nigerian law there is no specific 
legislation dealing with HIV/AIDS. However, the human rights provisions 
contained in Chapter 4 of the Constitution 1999 can be applied directly or 
indirectly to issues relating to HIV/AIDS. Chapter 4 of the Nigerian Consti-
tution, amongst others, guarantees other human rights, such as the right to 
human dignity, privacy, life, liberty, non-discrimination, etc. Like the con-
stitutions of most Commonwealth countries, the Nigerian Constitution does 
not guarantee the right to health as an enforceable right. The provision that 
makes reference to health in the Constitution is found in section 17 in chap-
ter 2 of the Constitution. While section 17(1) of the Constitution provides for 
10 See Festus Odaife (fn 7 above) para 35.
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‘freedom, equality and justice’, section 17(3)(d) places an obligation on the 
state to ensure that there are adequate medical and health facilities for all 
persons’. However, this section is under Chapter 2 of the Constitution, which 
is captioned ‘Directive Principles of Government Policy,’ and which, accord-
ing to the Constitution, is not justiciable.11 
There are no specific constitutional provisions directly applying to prison-
ers. However, section 8 of the Prisons Act12 provides that in the event of a 
prisoner suffering from a serious illness, the prison authorities must provide 
him or her with medical treatment. 
With the exception of the human rights provisions in the Constitution, no 
other piece of legislation in the country has specific provisions relevant to 
protecting the rights of people living with HIV/AIDS in the country. However, 
a National Policy on HIV/AIDS was launched in 2003. It contains relatively 
weak provisions dealing with access to treatment for people living with HIV/
AIDS.13 It provides that the government will work towards ensuring that all 
persons in the country shall have access to the quality of health care that can 
adequately treat or manage their conditions, including the provision of anti-
retroviral medication. 
It further states that: 
(i)  Cost-effective and affordable care shall be made accessible to all people with HIV 
related illnesses including access to anti-retroviral therapy;
(ii)  The use of ARV shall be under medical supervision and shall be governed by es-
tablished effective guidelines. This will be updated regularly with the result of the 
research;
(iii)  A cost-effective drug lists for the management of HIV/AIDS shall be developed and 
incorporated into Nigeria’s essential drug list; and
(iv) The sale of ARVs shall be provided solely under strict medical supervision.
These provisions do not seem to obligate the Nigerian government to guar-
antee access to treatment for people living with HIV/AIDS in the country. At 
present there is no prison policy relating to HIV/AIDS, despite the increasing 
prevalence of the epidemic amongst prisoners. Nigerian prisons are besieged 
by series of problems ranging from overcrowding to the lack of basic facilities 
for prisoners. Several reports have chronicled the near state of abysmal mis-
ery and despondency prevailing in Nigerian prisons.14 This renders inmates 
particularly vulnerable to various forms of diseases including HIV/AIDS.
11 See s 6(6) of the Nigerian Constitution 1999, which provides that all rights, including the right to 
health, listed in ch 2 of the Constitution shall not be made justiciable.
12 The Prison Act ( fn 9 above).
13 Durojaye E and Ayakogbe O ‘A rights-based approach to access to HIV treatment in Nigeria’ (2005) 
5 African Human Rights Law Journal 287 at 302.
14 See for instance Nigeria: Amnesty International Delegates say prison conditions ‘appalling’ Amnesty 
International Press Release available at htpp/www.amnesty.org/library/index See also Civil Liberty 
Organisation (CLO) Behind the wall( Lagos, CLO 1991) US Department of State Nigerian Human 
Rights Practices available at htpp/www.dosfan.lib.uic.edu.
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4.  INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND GUIDLINES
At international law there exist a number of non-legally binding guidelines 
and binding human right instruments directly and indirectly dealing with the 
protection of prisoners’ rights in the context of HIV/AIDS. Some of these 
guidelines include the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners15, Body 
of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment16, Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners (SMR)17 
and Recommendation No. R (98) 7 of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States Concerning the Ethical and Organisational Aspects of Health Care in 
Prison.18 Most of the principles stated in these guidelines or instruments, al-
though they do not contain provisions on HIV/AIDS with regard to prisoners, 
provided for safeguarding the human rights of persons in detention, for exam-
ple, the right to be free from degrading and inhuman treatment, discrimina-
tory acts, and the right to enjoy the highest attainable state of health. 
However, two important international guidelines, namely, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) Guidelines on HIV Infection and AIDS in Prisons19 and 
the International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights20 directly ad-
dress the human rights of prisoners in the context of HIV/AIDS. The WHO 
guidelines, for instance, highlight standards that prison authorities in coun-
tries should strive to achieve with regard to preventing HIV/AIDS transmis-
sion in prison and at the same time ensuring care and treatment for prisoners 
infected with HIV/AIDS. Similarly, the International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS 
and Human Rights urge prison authorities to ensure prevention of HIV/AIDS 
in the prisons through availability of HIV-related information, education vol-
untary counseling and testing and facilitating access to care and treatment 
for those in need. 
It is widely accepted that access to treatment forms part of an individual’s 
rights to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental well-being. 
In short, access to treatment constitutes an integral part of the right to health 
and a denial of treatment to people living with HIV/AIDS amounts to a viola-
tion of their fundamental rights.21 The UN General Assembly, in its Decla-
ration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, states that ‘Access to medication is a 
fundamental element for achieving progressively the right of everyone to the 
15 Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, UN GA Res. 45/111, annex, 45 UN GAOR Supp (No 
49A) at 200, UN Doc. A/45/49 (1990), Principle 5.
16 Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, 
UN GA Res. 43/173, annex, 43N GAOR Supp (No 49) at 298, UN Doc. A/43/49 (1988), Principles 
2, 4 and 7.
17 Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted 30 August 1955, by the First 
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, UN Doc. 
A/CONF/611, annex I, ESC Res. 663C, 24 UN ESCOR Supp (No 1) at 11, UN Doc. E/3048 (1957), 
amended by ESC Res. 2076, 62 UN ESCOR Supp (No 1) at 35, UN Doc. E/5988 (1977).
18 Recommendation No. R 98(7) to Member States Concerning the Ethical and Organizational Aspects 
of Health Care in Prison adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 8 April 1998, at the 627th Meet-
ing of the Ministers’ Deputies [hereinafter Council of Europe Recommendation No .R 98(7)].
19 WHO Guidelines; Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS Prisons and AIDS – UNAIDS Point 
of View and Prisons and AIDS: UNAIDS Technical Update, Geneva, (1997)
20 Notes from the consultative meeting on International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights. 
UNCHR Res. 1997/33, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/150 (1997), para 29(e).
21 Durojaye & Ayankogbe (fn 13 above) 290.
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highest attainable standard of physical and mental well-being’.22 The right to 
health has been well recognised in numerous international and regional hu-
man rights instruments. One of the earliest documents to recognise this right 
is the Constitution of the World Health Organisation, which provides that 
health is a complete state of physical and mental well-being and not merely 
the absence of infirmity. In addition, this Constitution further declares that 
‘[t]he enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the 
fundamental rights of all human beings without distinction as to race, colour, 
and religion’23 The other instrument to guarantee the right to health is article 
25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). It provides that 
‘everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services’
Perhaps the most authoritative provision on the right to health is contained 
in article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR).24 It provides that State Parties to the Covenant must recog-
nise the right of every one to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health. It further stipulates the determinants essential 
for the enjoyment of the right to health. 
The Committee monitoring the implementation of this Covenant has noted 
that ‘[t]he right to health must be understood as the right to the enjoyment 
of a variety of facilities, goods, services and conditions necessary for the re-
alisation of the highest attainable standard of health’.25 It further noted that 
access to essential drugs constitutes a core obligation under the Covenant, 
which States Parties are expected to fulfil. According to the Committee, the 
enjoyment of the right to health is dependent on other rights, such as the right 
to life, dignity, privacy and non-discrimination, amongst others. Essentially, 
all health care facilities, goods and services must be available, accessible, 
acceptable and of good quality.26 
The revised Guideline 6 to the International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and 
Human Rights requires states to take necessary measures in ensuring equity 
in the availability and accessibility of quality goods, services, and HIV/AIDS 
prevention and treatment, including access to antiretroviral drugs for all per-
sons.27
At the regional level, the right to health is guaranteed under article 16 of the 
22 UN General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS Resolution A/S-26/L2 June 2001 para 15
23 The Constitution of the WHO was adopted by the International Health Conference, New York, 
19–22 June 1945 (opened for signature on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of 61states 14 UNTS 
185)
24 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 December 1966; GA 
Res 2200 (XXI), UN Doc A/6316 (1966) 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force on 3 January 1976)
25 The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health; UN Committee on ESCR General Comment 
No 14, UN Doc E/C/12/2000/4 para 12
26 Ibid. 
27 Adopted at the Third International Consultation on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights (Geneva 25 July 
2002), organised by the Human Rights Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights and Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS.
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African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter)28 and article 
14 of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women (Women’s 
Protocol).29 Article 16 of the African Charter provides that everyone has the 
right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health. On the 
other hand, article 14 of the Women’s Protocol guarantees women the right 
to health, including reproductive and sexual health. This makes the African 
Charter the first human rights treaty to recognise explicitly reproductive and 
sexual health as human rights. Nigeria has ratified most of these international 
and regional human rights instruments and it has even gone ahead to incor-
porate the African Charter into its domestic law.30 However, the mere fact that 
an international treaty can only be enforceable in the country if it has been 
incorporated into local law by the National Assembly makes the application 
of some of these international instruments difficult in the country.31  
Notwithstanding the provisions in the international instruments, the right 
to health has been criticised for being too vague and for intersecting with oth-
er rights.32 More importantly, like other social and economic rights, the right 
to health has been relegated to the background as a second generation right 
of lesser value, compared to civil and political rights.33 Many Commonwealth 
countries, including Nigeria, do not guarantee the right to health as a justi-
ciable right in their constitutions, but merely include it under the Directive 
Principles of Government Policy.34 This impedes the enjoyment of the right. 
Commenting on this restrictive approach Bryne argues thus.
Traditionally, health issues when they reach the courts (particularly in those jurisdictions 
where there is no explicit guarantee to the right to health) have tended to be dealt with 
from a negative civil liberties perspective rather than consideration of the positive state 
obligations to provide adequate resources or access to treatment for effective enjoyment. 
This is particularly the case in relation to mental health where judgments have tended 
to focus on the restrictions placed on patients rather than their right to adequate treat-
ment.35
In the Festus Odaife case, despite the absence of a clear provision guaran-
teeing the right to health in the Nigerian Constitution, the court found that 
the right to health of the applicants was violated by failure on the part of 
the prison officials to provide them with treatment. The court, in coming to 
this conclusion, relied on section 8 of the Prison Act, which requires that an 
28 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev 5, adopted by the 
Organisation of African Unity, 27 June 1981, (entered into force on 21October 1986).
29 The Protocol of African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 
approved by African Union governments in Maputo, 2003 CAB/LEG/66.6 (entered into force on 25 
November 2005 after Togo became the 15th country to ratify the Protocol).
30 See the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act cap 10 
Laws of Federation 1990.
31 See s 12 of the Nigerian Constitution 1999, which provides that a treaty will only have force in the 
country if the National Assembly has enacted it into law. 
32 David P F, International law and infectious diseases (1999) 12.
33 See, for instance, Evans T ‘A human rights to health?’ (2002) 23 Third World Quarterly 197 See also 
Fuller L ‘The forms and limits of adjudication’ (1978) 92 Harvard L R 353.
34 See Byrne I ‘Making the right to health a reality: Legal strategies for effective implementation’ a pa-
per delivered at Commonwealth Conference, London September 2005. Available at www.interights.
org/doc/health%20paper.doc.
35 Ibid.
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inmate is entitled to medical care in case of serious illness. The court held 
that it is an understatement to say that HIV/AIDS is a serious ailment where 
in fact it is decimating lives around the world. The court cited article 16 of 
the African Charter to conclude that the government was under obligation to 
provide treatment to the applicants who are prisoners living with HIV/AIDS. 
According to the court, ‘Article 16 (2) places a duty on the states to take nec-
essary measures to protect the health of their people and to ensure that they 
receive medical attention when they are sick’. The court undoubtedly took a 
bold and proactive step by invoking the provisions of the African Charter in 
favour of the applicants on this issue, given the fact that the right to health is 
not guaranteed as a justiciable right under the Nigerian Constitution 
Arguably, the reasoning of the court on this issue would have been more 
convincing had the court cited relevant principles under international law. 
For instance, the court could have referred to the provisions of the Interna-
tional Guidelines on HIV/AIDS on the need to ensure access to HIV treat-
ment for prisoners. As stated above, while these guidelines are not legally 
binding on states, they provide a framework and set standards that need to be 
observed by states with regard to dealing with prisoners. Moreover, the court 
could have cited international human rights jurisprudence for more persua-
sive interpretative guidance. For example, the decision of the African Com-
mission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in International Pen & Others (On 
behalf of Ken Saro Wiwa) v Nigeria36 is a case in point. In that case, Ken Saro 
Wiwa, a writer and environmental rights activist, together with eight others, 
was sentenced to death by the military junta of the Abacha government for 
his conduct regarding social crusade activities in oil rich Ogoniland. While 
still in detention awaiting his execution with others, his health deteriorated 
to the point that he required medical attention. The Nigerian government de-
nied him access to treatment. The African Commission held that Saro Wiwa’s 
right to health under article 16 of the African Charter had been violated by 
the Nigerian government. In arriving at this decision, the Commission stated 
the following:
The responsibility of the government is heightened in cases where an individual is in its 
custody and therefore someone whose integrity and well-being is completely dependent 
on the actions of the authorities. The state has a direct responsibility in this case. Despite 
requests for hospital treatment made by a qualified prison doctor, these were denied to 
Ken Saro Wiwa, causing his health to suffer to the point his life was endangered … This 
is a violation of article 16.
Similarly, the decision of the Commission in Purohit & More v The Gambia37 
could have lent greater force to the reasoning of the Nigerian Court on the 
issue of access to treatment. In that case, the Commission, while explaining 
the importance of the right to health under the African Charter, stated that 
the right to health includes guaranteeing the right to health facilities, access 
to goods and services to all without discrimination of any kind. 
The radical but commendable decision of the Court in invoking article 16 
36 (2000)AHLR 212(ACHPR 1998).
37 Communication 241/2001 decided at the 33rd Ordinary Session of the African Commission held 
from 15th–29th in Niamey, Niger May 2003
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of the African Charter to guarantee medical attention to HIV positive prison-
ers is an act of judicial activism. It suggests that the African Charter could 
be invoked to override or make up for the deficiency of the constitutional 
provisions on human rights. But this is highly contentious. It is a path, which 
needs to be tread with caution. The Supreme Court in Abacha v Fawehinmi38 
held that the African Charter, after incorporation into Nigerian domestic law, 
became part and parcel of the country’s law. But it warned that in the event of 
any conflict between the received law and the Constitution, the latter should 
take preeminence. The likely implication of the Supreme Court judgment on 
this subject is yet to be ascertained. For as long as this area of the law re-
mains unsettled the court’s judgment in Festus Odaife will encounter a degree 
of skepticism.
Another aspect of the Court’s decision relates to the issue of the right to 
equality of prisoners living with HIV/AIDS. Equality, as a legal term, does 
not lend itself to a generally acceptable definition. However, it has been rec-
ognised that equality is tantamount to non-discrimination; hence an act of 
discrimination will lead to the violation of rights to equality.39 According to 
the Canadian Supreme Court discrimination is described as
[a] distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal char-
acteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obliga-
tions, or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or which 
withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other 
members of society. Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an in-
dividual solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the charge of 
discrimination, while those based on an individual’s merits and capacities will rarely be 
so classed.40
The principle of non-discrimination has been well recognised in virtually all 
human rights instruments. Article 2 of the African Charter forbids discrimina-
tion based on sex, race, religion or other status, while article 3 guarantees 
to every individual the right to equality and equal protection of the law. The 
notion of substantive equality implies that every individual is treated in the 
same manner, taking into consideration each one’s peculiar circumstances. 
In other words, substantive equality, as different from formal equality, aims 
at promoting social justice and egalitarianism in a society, particularly for 
the marginalised or vulnerable groups.41 The Committee on ICESCR, in its 
Comment 14, observes that access to health care facilities should be made 
available to all and in particular to marginalised members of society, such as 
women, prisoners, people living with HIV/AIDS, etc. In what appears to be 
a reaffirmation of the doctrine of substantive equality, the Committee notes 
that ‘health facilities, goods and services must be accessible to all, especially 
the most vulnerable or marginalised sections of the population, in law and in 
38 (2001) 1 CHR 20.
39 See Shalev C ‘Rights to sexual and reproductive health: The ICPD and the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’ (2000) 4(2) Health and Human Rights 36 at 
39. 
40 Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, 1989 1 SCR 143.
41 Rawls J A theory of justice (1971) 24.
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fact, without discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds’.42 It has been 
held that the raison d’être of substantive equality is to respect and protect the 
human dignity of all.43
The court, in Festus Odaife, after a careful review of the relief sought by the 
applicants, came to the conclusion that the denial of treatment to the appli-
cants based on their HIV status did not amount to a violation of the right to 
non-discrimination as guaranteed by section 42(1) of the Constitution. That 
section provides that a ‘citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, ethnic 
group, place of origin, sex, religion or political opinion shall not by reason 
only that he is such a person ...’ be subjected to discrimination. The court 
reasoned further that disease or health status is not one of the enumerated 
grounds for non-discrimination in the Constitution. According to the court, 
‘… [the] right to freedom from discrimination as enshrined in section 42(1) of 
the Constitution did not cover discrimination by reason of illness or disease’. 
The court then refused to accept that the provision of section 42 has been 
violated. 
The court’s interpretation is rather narrow and restrictive. While it is agreed 
that the Nigerian Constitution does not cover discrimination based on illness 
or disease status, a purposive approach to section 42 would have no doubt 
covered a denial of treatment to prisoners solely based on their HIV/AIDS 
status. Under the provisions of Basic Principle 9 of the Council of Europe 
Recommendation, it is stated that access to health services should be made 
available in the prisons without discrimination on the ground of their legal 
situation.44 As rightly observed by UNAIDS, prisoners are members of the 
community and the mere fact that they have been temporarily denied their 
freedom to liberty by reason of incarceration, does not in any way deprive 
them of the other fundamental rights they are entitled to as human beings.45 
Besides, the court could have invoked article 2 of the African Charter, which 
forbids discrimination on ‘other status’. This phrase has been broadly ex-
plained to include health status and, in particular, HIV/AIDS status.46 The 
African Commission in the Purohit47 case, while explaining the importance of 
articles 2 and 3 of the African Charter, which both relate to equality and non- 
discrimination, has stated as follows: 
Article 2 lays down a principle that is essential to the spirit of the African Charter and is 
therefore necessary in eradicating discrimination in all its guises, while article 3 is impor-
tant because it guarantees fair and just treatment of individuals within a legal system of 
a given country. These provisions are non-derogable and therefore must be respected in 
all circumstances in order for anyone to enjoy all the rights provided under the African 
Charter.
The court, in its earlier statement, had quoted copiously from the Minister 
of Health & Ors v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)48 case to emphasise the 
42 See General Comment (fn 25 above).
43 National Coalition of Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999(1) SA 6 (CC)
44 See Basic Principle 9 of the Council of Europe Recommendation R 98(7) paras 10,11,and 19.
45 UNAIDS Handbook for legislators on HIV/AIDS, law and human rights (1999) 61.
46 Commission on Human Rights Resolutions 1995/44 of 3 March 1995 & 1996/43 of 19 April 1996
47 Purohit and Moore v The Gambia (fn 37 above). 
48 [2002] 10 BCLR 1033 (CC).
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devastating effect of HIV/AIDS in South Africa. One wonders what other evi-
dence the court requires in this regard. This narrow approach of the court is 
in contradistinction to recent developments worldwide on the interpretation 
of the right to non-discrimination. 
One cannot understand why the court was quick to invoke article 16 to 
justify a violation of the right to health of the applicants but failed to do the 
same in the case of non-discrimination. This merely exemplifies an inconsist-
ency on the part of the court. The applicants in this case are a historically dis-
advantaged group who deserve protection in the society. They are detained 
under appalling conditions, thus rendering them vulnerable to other viola-
tions of their rights. It is the duty of the court to do substantial justice in this 
kind of pathetic situation in which the applicants (who are also HIV positive) 
find themselves. Nigerian courts are courts of law and should not cease to be 
courts of justice.49
The court also addressed the interrelatedness of the right to health to the 
right to life. As stated above, the right to health has been described as linking 
with other rights, such as life, human dignity, non-discrimination, etc.50 This 
reaffirms the conclusions reached at the Vienna Programme of Action 199351 
where it was agreed that all human rights, social and economic and civil and 
political, are interrelated, interdependent and indivisible. The UN Committee 
on Civil and Political Rights, in its General Comment 6 on the right to life, has 
explained that a progressive rather than a narrow interpretation be given to 
the right to life in the Political Covenant. Significantly, the Committee noted 
that the right to life affects other rights, such as the right to housing, food and 
medical care.52 With regard to access to HIV treatment, Yamin has noted that 
a denial of treatment to people living with HIV/AIDS may ultimately deprive 
them of their right to life.53 Specifically, regarding the position of prisoners, 
it has been argued that access to HIV prevention and care programmes for 
them guarantees prisoners’ rights to life, security and human dignity.54
The right to life has been traditionally seen as a negative right, which re-
quires governments to refrain from taking life. However, recent views seem 
to regard the right to life as a positive right where a state is expected to pre-
serve lives.55 For instance, the Indian Supreme Court has held that a denial 
of emergency medical attention to a patient amounted to the violation of the 
right to life guaranteed in the Indian Constitution.56 The court, in reconceptu-
alising the right to life as creating positive obligations on states, reasoned that 
49 Per Nnamani JSC (as he then was) in N Esiri & Ors. V Idika & Ors (1987) 4 NWLR Pt. 66 503, 514 
(SC). 
50 General Comment (fn 25 above). 
51 Vienna Programme of Action UN Doc A/CONF 157/24 Part 1 ch III.
52 The Right to Life UN GAOR Human Rights Committee 37th session Supp No 40.
53 Yamin AE ‘Not just a tragedy: access to medication as a right under international law’ (2003) 21 
Boston University International Law Journal 326 at 334.
54 See Jurgens R and Bettridge G ‘HIV prevention for prisoners: Public health and human rights im-
peratives ‘ (2005) 15 INTERIGHTS Bulletin 56 at 57.
55 Cook RJ et al Reproductive health and human rights: Integrating medicines, ethics and law (2003) 
161.
56 Pachim Banga Khet Majoor Samity v State of West Bangal [1996] AIR( SC) 2426. 
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‘preservation of human life was of utmost importance’.57 Also, the Costa Ri-
can Supreme Court came to the same conclusion when it held that denial of 
anti-retroviral therapy to people living with HIV/AIDS impugns on their right 
to life.58 The African Commission, reaffirming the positive nature imposed by 
the right to life under article 4 of the African Charter on states in International 
Pen & Others (On behalf of Ken Sarowiwa) case59 stated as follows:
The protection of the right to life in article 4 also includes a duty for the state not to 
purposefully let a person die while in its custody. Here at least one of the victims’ lives 
was seriously endangered by the denial of medication during detention. Thus, there are 
multiple violations of article 4.
Similarly, in the SERAC case60 the Commission found the government of Ni-
geria in violation of different rights amongst which were the rights to health, 
clean environment and life under the African Charter when multi national 
oil companies caused oil pollution in Ogoniland. This confirms the Commis-
sion’s willingness to embrace the idea of the indivisibility and interrelated-
ness of all human rights guaranteed under the African Charter.
Furthermore, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights has held that the 
maltreatment of street children by the Guatemalan government is a violation 
of the right to life of the children. In coming to this conclusion, the Court 
stated:
The fundamental right to life includes not only the right of every human being not to be 
deprived of his/her life arbitrarily but also the right that he/she will not be prevented from 
having access to conditions that guarantee a dignified existence. 61
The decisions in the above cases clearly and cogently emphasise the positive 
nature of the duty imposed by the right to life and the indivisibility and inter-
relatedness of the right to health with the right to life. This should have been 
the approach of the court particularly if one bears in mind the precarious 
situation in the Nigerian prisons where overcrowding is rife and access to ba-
sic health facilities is acutely lacking, thus threatening the lives of inmates.62 
No doubt, had the court addressed its mind to these decisions it would have 
come to a different, albeit purposive conclusion on the interrelatedness of the 
right to health with the right to life of the applicants. The failure of the court to 
embrace this recent, but positive development at international law has been 
prejudicial to the interests of the applicants. 
57 See Byrne (fn 34 above).
58 Alvarez v Ccaja Costarricense de Seguro Social Exp 5778-V-97 No 5934-97(SC).
59 International Pen and others (On behalf of Ken Sarowiwa) case (fn 36 above)
60 Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Another v Government of Nigeria Communi-
cation 155/96 decided at the 30th Ordinary Session of the African Commission held from 13 to 27 
October 2001,Banjul, The Gambia.
61 Villagran Marales et al v Guatemala Series C No 65 19 Novemebr 1999(IACHR) para 144; See also 
The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria 
Communication 155/96 decided at the African Commission’s Ordinary Session held from 13 to 27 
October 2001.
62 See for example the Concluding Observation of the Human Rights Committee on Nigeria 24/7/96 
CCPR/C/79/Add.65.
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5   PURPOPSIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION: LESSONS FROM OTHER 
COMMONWEALTH JURISDICTIONS
It is worthy of note that the court in Festus Odaife decided to invoke the provi-
sion of article 16 of the African Charter without even considering a creative 
interpretation of the human rights provisions under Chapter 4 of the Nigerian 
Constitution. Although, while this proactive stance of the court is commend-
able, it pitches the court against the decision of the Supreme Court in the 
Abacha63 case. The Supreme Court, the highest court of justice in Nigeria, has 
held that in the event of any conflict between the provisions of the Nigerian 
Constitution and that of the African Charter the former should supercede. 
This is more so when one takes into consideration the fact that the doctrine 
of judicial precedence is well known to Nigerian legal system. 
The court could have avoided this ‘apparent confrontation’ by making ref-
erences to the ingenuity and intrepidity of the Indian courts on this issue. It is 
to be noted that India shares a similar common law background with Nigeria. 
Under the Indian Constitution, social and economic rights (just as the case in 
Nigeria) fall under directive principles, hence are non-justiciable. However, 
Indian courts have creatively interpreted this portion of the constitution so as 
to give life to its enforceability. For instance, the court in the celebrated case 
of Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation64 found that the eviction of the 
petitioners from their dwellings amounted to a deprivation of their livelihood. 
This decision provides an avenue for courts to imply violation of civil and 
political rights in a case dealing with social and economic rights. Similarly, 
in the Majoor Samity65 case the Indian Supreme Court held that a denial of 
emergency medical treatment to an individual violated the right to life under 
article 21 of the Indian Constitution. 
This kind of approach is not only creative but also realistic as it recognises 
the inherent deficiencies in a constitution with regard to the enforceability of 
social and economic rights, but simultaneously pinpoints the role of the court 
in the effective interpretation of the constitution. 
On the issue of costs of treatment for the applicants who are living with 
HIV/AIDS the Court, in Festus Odiafe, came to the conclusion that costs can-
not be an excuse for the prison authorities to fail to provide medical treat-
ment for the applicants. The rationale for the court’s decision needs to be 
regarded cautiously since the respondents in the case (the Attorney General 
and the Nigerian Prison Authorities) did not file any defence that could have 
assisted the court to come to a logical conclusion on this issue. But the fact 
remains that over the years Nigerian prisons have been grossly underfunded 
and cannot meet their myriad needs. 
But a reference to other jurisdictions, such as South Africa, to demonstrate 
how similar cases have been decided by the courts could have given the court 
63 Abacha v Fawehinmi (fn 38 above)
64 (1985)3 SCC 545
65 Pachim Banga Khet Majoor Samity v State of West Bangal (fn 56 above)
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in Odiafe a more enlightened insight into this issue. The government’s duty to 
provide resources with regard to social and economic rights has remained a 
thorny issue even when social and economic rights are explicitly guaranteed 
in a constitution. A case in mind in this regard is the South African Constitu-
tional Court decision in Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal.66 
In that case, a man suffering from renal failure and in need of renal dialysis 
was refused treatment in a public hospital. He instituted a constitutional ac-
tion, claiming that he was entitled to treatment under section 27(3) which 
deals with the right to emergency treatment and section 11 of the Constitu-
tion, dealing with right to life. However, the Constitutional Court refused to 
grant his request, holding that granting such a request would have great con-
sequences for the resources of the state. It further held that since resources 
are often inadequate, a refusal of treatment to the applicant did not amount 
to either a violation of section 27 or section 11 of the South African Consti-
tution. Ngwena has argued that though this decision was correctly arrived 
at taking into account the peculiarity of the case, the reasoning of the court 
was not convincing enough as it placed a restrictive interpretation on section 
27(3) of the Constitution and equally painted a picture of undue judicial def-
erence to matters of allocations of resources in the health care sector.67 
More importantly, the subsequent decision of the Constitutional Court in 
the landmark case of Minister of Health & Ors v Treatment Action Campaign68 
(thereafter TAC case) could have served as a good inspiration to the Court in 
arriving at its decision. Although the Court in Odaife referred to TAC case, it 
did not clearly expound on the reasoning of the court in that case. In the TAC 
case, the government of South Africa was held to have violated the right of 
children under section 28 and the right to health care under section 27 of the 
South African Constitution for failing to provide nevirapine (an anti-retroviral) 
free of charge to pregnant women to prevent mother-to-child transmission of 
HIV/AIDS at public health institutions. Unlike the case of Soobramoney the 
Court adopted a more purposive interpretation of the South African Constitu-
tion, rejecting lack of resources as an excuse for the government’s inability to 
meet its obligations under sections 28 and 27 of the Constitution. Drawing 
inspiration from the Grootboom69 case, the court found that the government’s 
policy, which restricted availability of nevirapine, was unreasonable and prej-
udicial to the interest of children. 
A major point of departure between the TAC case and Soobramoney case is 
the fact that in the TAC case, while the court conceded that the executive has 
constitutional pre-eminence with regard to policy decision-making, nonethe-
less, it did not interprete the doctrine of separation of powers ‘as implying 
 
66 [1997] 6 BCLR 78 (CC)
67 See Ngwena C ‘ The historical development of modern South African health care system: From 
privilege to egalitarianism (2004) De Jure 290 at 308
68 Minister of Health and ors v Treatment Action Campaign (fn 48 above)
69 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 3 BCLR 227 (CC). This case has been 
regarded a pace-setter in the promotion of socio-economic rights in South Africa.
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judicial abdication on policy matters that impact on fundamental rights’70
In addition, one might argue that the case of B v Minister of Correctional 
Services71 would have been very apposite as a persuasive authority for this 
case since it had been decided at the time of the court’s decision in Odaife. In 
that case, four prisoners living with HIV/AIDS, who were refused anti-retro-
viral therapy, brought an action against the South African prison authorities 
claiming that they were entitled to treatment at government expenses under 
section 35(2)(e) of the South African Constitution. Just as in the TAC case, the 
South African government raised the issue of lack of resources for its inability 
to provide medical care for the applicants. The court rejected this argument, 
holding that there was insufficient evidence showing lack of resources on the 
part of the government. The court ordered that medical care be provided for 
two of the applicants based on medical reports. This case however, has been 
criticised for its want of depth in international human rights jurisprudence.72 
More recently the AIDS Law Project, on behalf of about 15 prisoners living 
with HIV/AIDS in Westville Prison in KwaZulu-Natal73, lodged an application 
at a High Court seeking the removal of barriers to prisoners’ access to treat-
ment. In their complaints the applicants had claimed that they were entitled 
to be granted access to treatment in accordance with sections 27 and 35(2)(e) 
of the Constitution and the Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV/AIDS 
Care, Management and Treatment of 2003. In his judgment delivered in 
July of 2006, Judge Pillay granted the order and ordered the Department of 
Correctional Services and the prison authorities to indicate to the prisoners 
and the court how treatment access could be speeded up. The judge ob-
served that the steps taken by government to assure access to HIV treatment 
for the prisoners, in accordance with its obligations under sections 27 and 
35(2)(e) of the South African Constitution, were not only slow but inadequate 
and unreasonable.74 The government later failed to comply with this court 
order, thereby necessitating another application to enforce the judgment. 
In the hearing of this application,75 the court, on 28 August 2006, ordered 
the government to make available to it by 8 September 2006 plans of 
how treatment would be provided to the prisoners in the Westville Prison. 
The court castigated the negative attitudes of the government to its ear-
lier order on the same issue, emphasising that such attitudes could 
pose a serious threat to the principle of separation of powers and respect for 
the rule of law.76 
 
70 See Ngwena (fn 65 above) 304
71 [1997] 6 BCLR 789 (C)
72 Ngwena C ‘Access to anti-retroviral therapy to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV as a so-
cio-economic right: An application of section 27 of the Constitution’ (2003) 18 South African Public 
Law 83
73 EN and others v The Government of South Africa and others Unreported case No 4567/06 delivered 
on 25 July 2006 available at htpp/www.alp.org
74 Ibid para 27 
75 See EN and others v The Government of South Africa & Others Unreported case No 4576/06 delivered 
on 28 August 2006 available at htpp/www.alp.org. 
76 Ibid para 33
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Unlike Nigeria, South Africa has adequate laws and policies to protect pris-
oners living with HIV/AIDS. Apart from the specific provisions under sec-
tion 35 of the Constitution, the Correctional Services Act77 contains detailed 
provisions protecting the prisoner’s access to health care services. Section 
12 of the Act specifically enjoins the government to make available health 
care services to prisoners within its ‘available resources’. Moreover, the 1996 
Policy on the management of HIV/AIDS in Prisons contains detailed proce-
dures against preventing the spread of the epidemic in South African prisons 
and providing care and support for those infected. The court in Odaife could 
have availed itself of decided South African cases to come to a more differ-
entiated decision. 
Although decisions by courts in other jurisdictions are not binding on Ni-
gerian courts, they have persuasive authority. More importantly, Nigerian 
courts are likely to treat with greater respect decisions of courts in other Com-
monwealth jurisdictions than those of other jurisdictions. Over the years 
there have been emerging trends in some Commonwealth countries, such as 
South Africa, India, and Botswana of adopting a purposive interpretation of 
the wordings of the constitution. The South African Constitutional Court in 
Hoffman v South African Airways (SAA) (herein after called Hoffman case)78 
adopted such a purposive approach when a prospective employee living with 
HIV was denied employment by SAA due to his HIV status. The court found 
that such denial of employment to the plaintiff because of his HIV status 
was unfounded and a violation of the right to equality under section 9 of 
the South African Constitution. The court reached this decision despite the 
fact that disease or health status is not listed as one of the grounds for non- 
discrimination in the Constitution. In arriving at its decision the court relied 
on its earlier decision in the Harksen case79 where it laid down the factors to 
consider in determining unfairness of discrimination in accordance with sec-
tion 9 of the Constitution. These include the following:
(a) the position of the victim in the society;
(b) the purpose sought to be achieved by the discrimination;
(c) the extent to which the rights and interest of the victims of discrimination 
has been affected; and
(d) whether the discrimination has impaired the human dignity of the vic-
tim. 
The above principles enunciated by the South African courts on equality were 
inspired by Canadian jurisprudence. For example, in Law v Canada (Minister 
of Employment and Immigration)80 (known as the Law Test) the Canadian 
Supreme Court enumerated several factors that must be considered before 
establishing unfair discrimination under section 15 of the Canadian Constitu-
tion. Firstly, the position of the complainant in the society, that is, whether or 
77 Act 111 of 1998
78 [2000] 11 BCLR 1235 (CC)
79 Harksen v Lane NO and others 1999(1) SA 300(CC)
80 Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1999) 1 SCR 497; 170 DLR (4th) 1 para 
39
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not the complainant has been a disadvantaged person in the society. Second-
ly, the purpose of the differentiation, that is, did the law aim to achieve a vital 
societal goal in favour of one who is vulnerable or had been disadvantaged? 
Thirdly, the impact of the differentiation on the rights of the complainant, that 
is, does the law impact adversely on his or her fundamental human dignity? 
The court further emphasised that the paramount consideration in determin-
ing the violation of the equality clause of the Constitution is the protection of 
the dignity of the complainant.
Another good example of the purposive interpretation of a constitution is 
the Botswana case of Makuto v State81 where an accused person charged with 
rape was made to undergo an HIV test in accordance with section 142(2) of 
the Penal Code of Botswana. Section 142(2) (b) of the law requires that an 
HIV positive person convicted of the offence of rape be sentenced to a maxi-
mum punishment of 20 years imprisonment. The accused in this case tested 
positive to HIV and was therefore sentenced to 16 years imprisonment and 
strokes with a light cane. He contended on appeal that the provision of the 
law, which requires harsher punishment for an HIV positive sex offender, is 
discriminatory and contrary to section 15 of the Botswana Constitution.82 
The Constitution does not specifically proscribe discrimination based on HIV 
status. Notwithstanding, the court held that the provision of section 15 is 
not meant to be exhaustive and as such can accommodate other grounds 
of discrimination, such as HIV status. The court therefore concluded that 
harsher punishment for HIV positive offenders is discriminatory and violates 
section 15 of the Constitution. However, the court was able to justify this 
harsher punishment based on section 15(4)(e), which provides for limita-
tions on individual rights to non-discrimination on certain justified grounds. 
The willingness on the part of the court to expand the scope of section 15 of 
the Constitution to cover HIV status is quite commendable and undoubtedly 
an enlightened approach to the meaning of discrimination. That could have 
been the approach in the Festus Odaife case
Similarly an Indian High Court in Mr X v State Bank of India,83 has con-
demned discrimination against persons living with HIV/AIDS in the work-
place. In that case, a sweeper who had worked for the State Bank of India for 
nine years on a contract basis was denied a permanent position after testing 
HIV-positive. The court held that the earlier ruling in M/s ZY prohibited em-
ployment discrimination based on HIV status alone and insisted that Mr X be 
absorbed into a permanent position. The pronouncement of the court in that 
case is noteworthy. Shah J emphasised the need for an inclusive, supportive 
approach to those infected and affected by HIV, stating the following 
Most people with HIV/AIDS continue working which enhances their physical and mental 
well-being and they should be entitled to do so. They should be enabled to contribute 
their creativity and productivity in a supportive occupational setting. HIV positive per-
sons may have years of constructive, healthy service ahead of them. To exclude them 
81  (2000) 5 LRC 183. Bostwana Court of Appeal
82  S 15 of the Botswana Constitution proscribes discrimination on the grounds of race, tribe, place of 
origin, political opinions, colour or creed
83  High Court at Bombay Writ petition No.1856 of 2002, heard 2004
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lacks a rational foundation and is unfair. HIV infected persons need maximum under-
standing and help wherever possible.84
Had the court in Odaife adopted the above reasoning, it would have been 
easy for it to reach a different conclusion on the interpretation of section 42 
since, clearly, people living with HIV/AIDS have continued to be stigmatised 
and discriminated against in the country. Rather than the formal approach 
adopted by the court, it could perhaps have considered the impact of refusal 
of treatment based on HIV/AIDS status on the human dignity of the prison-
ers. As the court rightly puts it in the Hoffman case:
At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination is the recognition under our Consti-
tution that all human beings, regardless of their position in the society must be accorded 
equal dignity. That dignity is impaired when a person is unfairly discriminated against.85
6  CONCLUSION
The decision of the court in Odaife, the first decided case on HIV by a Nige-
rian court might be described as a mixed blessing in the sense that the court 
was very proactive in holding that the applicants’ right to health was violated. 
However, the decision was disappointing in the sense that the court fell short 
of holding that a denial of treatment to HIV positive prisoners amounted 
to discrimination and violation of the right to life. Furthermore, the court 
failed to take a critical look at international human rights jurisprudence on 
the link between right to health and other rights. This robbed the decision of 
its jurisprudential importance. Cases decided in other jurisdictions, such as 
South Africa and India could have been useful to the Court in reaching its 
decision.
Even though the court proactively invoked article 16 of the African Charter 
to find the Nigerian government to be in violation of the rights of the appli-
cants, the court surprisingly, made no reference to the jurisprudence of the 
African Commission nor to international guidelines or principles relating to 
the situation of prisoners. Clearly, this is an oversight which in turn can be 
regarded as a shortcoming. For while some of these guidelines and principles 
may not be binding on the Nigerian government, they no doubt lay down 
standards that should be followed with regard to the treatment of prisoners. 
This decision in Festus Odaife case clearly highlights again the need for the 
enactment of legislation dealing with the stigmatisation and discrimination of 
people living with HIV/AIDS in Nigeria. The fact of the matter is that at the 
UN Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, world leaders agreed that to 
enact anti-discrimination legislation dealing with HIV/AIDS in their respec-
tive countries by the end of 2003. Nigeria has yet to live up to this commit-
ment. There can be no better time to do this than now.
84  Ibid para 8
85  Hoffman case ( fn 78 above) para 27
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